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THE NEED FOR REGULATIONS TO ADDRESS THE SLOW
TRANSITION TO HALON ALTERNATIVES IN THE
CIVIL AVIATION INDUSTRY
BAILEY PIAM*
IN THE MID-1970s, scientists discovered that some man-made
chemicals were destroying the ozone layer, which resulted in
an increase in ultraviolet radiation exposure. In response to this
discovery, many countries decided to address this global threat,
culminating in the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer.' The participating countries made
commitments to eliminate production of ozone-depleting sub-
stances by certain deadlines. 2 One category of these substances
is halons, the production of which the Montreal Protocol re-
quired to cease by 1994.1
Before 1994, halons, especially Halon 1301 and Halon 1211,
were used extensively as effective gaseous fire-suppression
agents.4 After production ceased, many industries found substi-
tutes and halon alternatives; however, the civil aviation industry
has not been successful in implementing halon alternatives.5
Old and new aircraft still rely on halons as fire-suppression
agents.'
* B.S., cum laude, Wake Forest University, 2002; M.S., Wake Forest University,
2002; J.D. Candidate, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law,
May 2008. The author would like to thank her mother, Zo6, and her father,
Gabriel, for their love and support. In addition, the author would also like to
thank Theo Foster for his guidance as Comment Editor and Melanie Spriggs for
her time, effort, and superb editing as Managing Editor.
I Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,
1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Montreal
Protocol].
2 See generally Montreal Protocol, supra note 1.
3 Id. art. 2B.
4 David Catchpole et al., Slow Transition to Halon Alternatives in New Aircraft
Raises Concern, ICAO J., Nov./Dec. 2005, at 6-7.
5 Id. at 7.
6 Id.
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Civil aircrafts have four applications that use halon for fire
suppression: 7 lavatory trash receptacle extinguishers, handheld
extinguishers, cargo compartment extinguishers, and engine na-
celle and auxiliary power unit protection systems.' Of these
four applications, halon alternatives have been identified for all
applications except for the engine nacelle and auxiliary power
unit protection systems.9 Nonetheless, only one alternative has
been installed on one type of aircraft for the lavatory trash re-
ceptacle extinguisher.1" This may soon become a problem for
the aviation industry as the halon stockpile decreases and no
alternatives have been identified and installed in the aircraft."
This Comment will discuss the status of identifying halon al-
ternatives in the civil aircraft applications and the technical, eco-
nomic, and regulatory issues involved with implementing these
alternatives for each of the four applications. The various tech-
nical, economic, and regulatory barriers will be compared to de-
termine which of the barriers serve as the greatest impediment
to the civil aviation industry. Furthermore, this paper will dis-
cuss the courses of action recommended by the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) and the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), and evaluate whether the air-
lines will be able to comply with the recommended courses of
action.
I. WHAT CAUSED THE PROBLEM?: PROTECTING THE
ENVIRONMENT AND THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL ON
SUBSTANCES THAT DEPLETE THE OZONE LAYER
A stratospheric layer of ozone protects the ecosystem from
harmful rays of ultraviolet radiation from the sun. However, this
layer is in danger due to society's activities and the man-made
chemicals people introduce into the atmosphere. These chemi-
cals are interacting with the ozone to create a hole in this layer,
harming the environment.12 In response to this hole, some
7 Id.
8 Id. The engine nacelle refers to the streamlined enclosure surrounding the
jet engine compressor, combustors, and turbine. ANTHONY HAMINS & CLEARY
THOMAS, NAT'L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., SUPPRESSION CRITERIA IN ENGINE NA-
CELLE FiREs 664 (1995), available at http://www.fire.nist.gov/bfrlpubs/fire95/
PDF/f95140.pdf.
9 Catchpole et al., supra note 4, at 7.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 8.
12 See infra text accompanying note 37.
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countries entered into an international agreement to formulate
provisions to identify both the causes of the ozone hole and a
plan to eliminate them.13 One of the causes identified was the
use of halons in multiple industries. 14
A. THE OZONE HOLE
Ozone, which consists of three oxygen atoms, is a "highly reac-
tive form of oxygen [and] is found in trace quantities both in
the natural stratosphere (15-50 km altitude) and in polluted sur-
face air."'15 "Ozone is created when short-wave ultraviolet radia-
tion splits an ordinary two-atom oxygen molecule [and] the
chemically active single atoms attach themselves to ordinary oxy-
gen molecules to form three-atom molecules of ozone. '"16
Ozone is a powerful oxidizing agent that, while explosive and
toxic in high concentrations, is only a minimal threat to human
beings. 17
The effects of ozone are dependent on its location. Ozone
may be harmful or protective depending on where the ozone
exists.' 8 If the ozone is located in the stratosphere (approxi-
mately 25-40 km above the Earth's surface) then the ozone acts
as a shield to block out the sun's harmful ultraviolet rays. 19 This
shield helps protect individuals from skin cancer, cataracts, and
impaired immune systems. 20 However, the closer the ozone is to
the Earth's surface, the more it acts as a toxic pollutant that
damages plants and lung tissue. 21 The ozone located at surface
level is a major component of smog and is destructive to one's
health. 22
Basically, there are two types of ozone. One type of ozone
serves as a gaseous shield in the stratosphere, while the second
type is a destructive, toxic molecule that exists closer to the
13 See infra text accompanying notes 33-37.
14 See infra text accompanying note 37.
'5 MAUREEN CHRISTIE, THE OZONE LAYER 9 (2001).
16 OLIVER E. ALLEN, PLANET EARTH ATMOSPHERE 52 (1983).
17 Id.
18 See ANNIKA NILSSON, ULTRAVIOLET REFLECTIONS: LIFE UNDER A THINNING
OZONE LAYER 21 (1996).
19 Id. at 14-15.
20 ALEXANDER GILLESPIE, CLIMATE CHANGE, OZONE DEPLETION AND AIR POLLU-
TION: LEGAL COMMENTARIES WITH POLICY AND SCIENCE CONSIDERATIONS 98-101
(2006).
21 NILSSON, supra note 18, at 21.
22 Id.
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Earth's surface. 23 "The total concentration of ozone in the at-
mosphere depends on the balance between the reactions that
create ozone and the ones that destroy it."'24 It is important to
maintain a proper balance in these processes; therefore, scien-
tists have conducted studies on these processes to determine
what creates and destroys ozone.
For example, in the 1950s, a research group from The British
Antarctic Survey began to study the Polar Stratospheric Clouds
over Antarctica. 25 As a result of these studies, three of the scien-
tists from the research group, Joseph Farman, Brian Gardiner,
and Jonathan Shanklin, discovered the Antarctic ozone hole.26
Their findings "revealed that between 1980 and 1984, the ozone
present over Antarctica, on both an all-seasons basis, but most
spectacularly, in spring, was thinning by up to 50 percent. 27
These findings were first reported in 1984 and published in Na-
ture in May of 1985.28
Over the years, the ozone hole has become more of a concern
as it has rapidly increased. In 2001, scientists reported that the
hole "was over three times the size of continental Europe. "29
The ozone hole is also of concern because it is not restricted to
Antarctica.3 ° The hole forms over Antarctica each October and
then rotates after eight weeks, passing "over more populated ar-
eas, including [t] he Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the tip
of South America."3 This hole allows harmful, high-energy ra-
diation into the Earth's ecosystem, which is known to cause skin
cancer, create cataracts, harm one's immune system, and upset
the fragile balance of an entire ecosystem. 2
B. THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL ON SUBSTANCES THAT DEPLETE
THE OZONE LAYER
In response to the discovery of the hole in the ozone layer,
the member states of the UNEP agreed to the Vienna Conven-
23 Id.
24 Id. at 17.
25 CHRISTIE, supra note 15, at 38.
26 Id. at 50.
27 GILLESPIE, supra note 20, at 153.
28 CHRISTIE, supra note 15, at 38.
29 GILLESPIE, supra note 20, at 6.
30 The Ozone Hole, Ozone Hole History, http://vww.theozonehole.com/
ozoneholehistory.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2007).
31 Id.
32 See GILLESPIE, supra note 20, at 98-102.
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tion of 1985." : Through the Convention, the member nations
established mechanisms for international cooperation in re-
searching the ozone layer, the effects of ozone-depleting chemi-
cals (ODCs), and the identification of alternative substances and
technologies. 4 This international cooperative effort led to the
creation of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer, which was negotiated and signed by twenty-
four countries and the European Economic Community on Sep-
tember 16, 1987, at the Montreal headquarters of the ICAO. 5
The Montreal Protocol, which became effective in 1989, "con-
tains provisions for regular review of the adequacy of control
measures that are based on assessments of evolving scientific,
environmental, technical, and economic information."36 Based
on the scientific findings discussed at the Vienna Convention
regarding evidence that certain elements were depleting the
stratospheric ozone layer, the Montreal Protocol established
deadlines for the phase-out of production and consumption of
controlled (ozone-depleting) substances, which include
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), halons, and hydro chlorofluoro-
carbons (HCFCs) . To achieve this phase-out, the agreement
provides trade sanctions for countries that do not comply with
the deadlines, as well as incentives for non-signing countries to
sign the agreement.38 The purpose of these sanctions and in-
centives is to stress the importance of addressing the problem
on a global level and to identify less harmful alternatives. 9 To
date, over 180 countries have signed the agreement, recognizing
the necessity of a global effort to protect the environment from
such harmful substances.4 °
The parties amended the provisions of the Montreal Protocol
five times at meetings in London (1990), Copenhagen (1992),
33 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,097, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293 [hereinafter 1985 Vienna Convention];
NILSSON, supra note 18, at 4.
34 1985 Vienna Convention, supra note 33.
35 Montreal Protocol, supra note 1; EDWARD A. PARSON, PROTECTING THE
OZONE LAYER: SCIENCE AND STRATEGY 137 (2003).
36 Alternative Fluorocarbons Environmental Acceptability Study (AFEAS),
Montreal Protocol, http://www.afeas.org/montreal-protocol.html (last visited
Nov. 16, 2007) [hereinafter Alternative Fluorocarbons]; see also Montreal Proto-
col, supra note 1.
37 Catchpole et al., supra note 4, at 6; Alternative Fluorocarbons, supra note 36.
38 Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, art. 4-4a.
39 PARSON, supra note 35, at 129-30, 137; Catchpole et al., supra note 4, at 6.
40 Catchpole et al., supra note 4, at 6.
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Vienna (1995), Montreal (1997), and Beijing (1999).41 For the
most part, these amendments accelerated the phase-out sched-
ules of the controlled substances.42 As for halons, the current
provisions of the Montreal Protocol required developed coun-
tries to phase out the production of halons by January 1, 1994,
and developing countries to phase out byJanuary 1, 2010.41 Al-
though the parties to the Montreal Protocol accelerated the
phase-out schedules, other regulatory bodies, such as the Euro-
pean Union (formerly known as the European Community) and
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), have imple-
mented even stricter regulations and phase-out schedules. 44
In compliance with the Montreal Protocol, the U.S. govern-
ment implemented the Clean Air Act45 to prohibit the produc-
tion and import of virgin halons 1211, 1301, and 2402
beginning January 1, 1994.46 Under section 602 of the Clean
Air Act, the EPA classifies ozone-depleting chemicals as class I
and class II substances.4 7 Class I substances, which include
halons, are chemicals with ozone-depletion potential of 0.2 or
greater." The EPA also issued a final rule on March 5, 1998
barring the production of a halon blend with two or more of the
prohibited halons.49 The EPA did, however, allow an exception
for halon blends formulated using recycled halons solely for the
purpose of aviation fire protection, provided that blends pro-
41 Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, i; GILLESPIE, supra note 20, at 243.
42 Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, art. 2-21; Alternative Fluorocarbons, supra
note 36.
43 Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, art. 2B.
4- Alternative Fluorocarbons, supra note 36.
45 Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
46 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7626 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007); Envtl. Prot. Agency,
Questions and Answers on Halons and Their Substitutes, http://www.epa.gov/
ozone/snap/fire/qa.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2007) [hereinafter Questions and
Answers]. Virgin halons are newly produced halons, as opposed to recycled
halons or halons contained in a halon bank. Press Release, United Nations (UN)
Env't Programme, UNEP Launches Business-to-Business (B2B) Environmental
Web Portal 1 (Mar. 2001), available at http://www.unepie.org/ozonaction/infor-
mation/mmcfiles/4699-e-oht.pdf.
47 Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 101-549, Title VI, § 602, 104 Stat. 2399, 2649
(1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7671-7671a (West 2003)).
48 Id.
49 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Manufacture of Halon Blends, Inten-
tional Release of Halon, Technician Training and Disposal of Halon and Halon-
Containing Equipment, 63 Fed. Reg. 11,083, 11,085-86 (Mar. 5, 1998) [hereinaf-
ter Protection of Stratospheric Ozone], available at http://www.epa.gov/EPA-
AIR/1998/March/Day-05/a5720.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2007); Questions and
Answers, supra note 46.
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duced under this exemption are recycled to meet the relevant
purity standards for each individual halon. 50 After these rules,
the only sources of halon in the United States are recycled
halon and inventories produced before January 1, 1994.51
C. ONE OF THE CAUSES OF THE OZONE HOLE: HALONS
The increase in the size of the hole in the ozone layer is due
to ozone-depleting chemicals that contain certain trace ele-
ments of nitrogen, hydrogen, bromine, and chlorine. 2 The
ozone-depleting chemicals that contain these trace elements in-
clude CFCs, halons, carbon tetrachloride, methyl chloroform,
HCFCs, hydrobromoflourocarbons (HBFCs), and methyl bro-
mide.53 Besides CFCs, halons cause the most destruction to the
stratospheric ozone layer.54
"Halons are gaseous or easily vaporized halocarbons used pri-
marily for putting out fires, but also for explosion protection. 55
In the United States, the three types of halons used most often
are Halon 1211, which is mainly used in streaming applications,
Halon 1301, which is mainly used in total flooding applications,
and Halon 2402, which serves as "an extinguishant in engine
nacelles (the streamlined enclosure surrounding the engine).'56
Streaming applications are also known as local applications.57
These applications, which are often manually operated, consist
of systems that apply the fire suppression agent directly onto a
fire or into the area of a fire.58 Conversely, total flooding appli-
cations "apply an extinguishing agent to an enclosed space in
order to achieve a concentration of the agent. 59
50 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. at 11,085.
51 Id. at 11,086.
52 GILLESPIE, supra note 20, at 4.
53 See id. at 19-30.
54 HUGHES Assocs., INC. & ICF CONSULTING, REVIEW OF THE TRANSITION AWAY
FROM HALONS IN U.S. CIVIL AVIATION APPLICATIONS 5 (2004), available at http://
www.epa.gov/ozone/snap/fire/FinalCivilAviationReport2 1-Sept04.pdf.
55 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 11,083, 11,085 (Mar. 5,
1998).
56 Id.; Catchpole et al., supra note 4, at 7.
57 ROBERT T. WICKHAM, WICKHAM ASSOCS., STATUS OF INDUSTRY EFFORTS TO RE-
PLACE HALON FIRE EXTINGUISHING AGENTS 7 (2002), available at http://www.epa.
gov/ozone/snap/fire/status.pdf.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 6.
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Halons possess several characteristics that make them popular
for use as fire protectants. 60 First, halons "are highly effective
against solid, liquid/gaseous, and electrical fires. '6 1 Second,
halons usually do not cause secondary damage because they dis-
perse quickly and do not leave a residue on the property being
protected.6 2 Third, halons "require relatively simple design and
installation."6 3 Fourth, halons do not conduct electricity and
are effective over broad temperature ranges, so they are effec-
tive at extinguishing fires around electrical equipment.64 Fi-
nally, "halons are generally safe for limited human exposure
when used with proper exposure controls. '6 5 Depending on the
location of the fire, all of these characteristics make halons at-
tractive for use as a fire suppressant for the aviation industry.
Although there are advantages to using halons for fire and
explosion protection, there are also disadvantages to using
halons due to their effects on the ozone. Halons contain bro-
mine, which reacts more strongly with ozone than the chlorine
found in CFCs, the most commonly known ozone-depleting
chemicals. 66 For example, in 1986, halons represented twenty-
three percent of the ozone destruction associated with class I of
the ozone-depleting chemicals, even though halon production
at the time consisted of only two percent of production of all
class I substances.6" Before the early 1990s, testing and training,
service and repair, and accidental discharges released more
halons into the air than actually extinguishing fires. 6' Through
the Montreal Protocol's technology assessment, the Halons
Technical Options Committee (HTOC) discovered that "only 15
percent of annual Halon 1211 emissions and 18 percent of an-
nual Halon 1301 emissions occur as a result of use to extinguish
60 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. at 11,085; HUGHES AsSOCS.
& ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 5.
61 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. at 11,085.
62 Id.; HUGHES ASSOCS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 5.
63 HUGHES ASSOCS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 5.
64 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. at 11,085.
65 Id.
66 GILLESPIE, supra note 20, at 24; HUGHES ASSOCS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra
note 54, at 5.
67 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. at 11085-86. The EPA clas-
sified ozone depleting chemicals as class I and class II substances under section
602 of the Clean Air Act. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 101-549, Title VI, 5602, 104
Stat. 2399, 2649 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7671-7671a
(West 2003)).
68 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. at 11,085-86.
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actual fires. '"69 Based on these findings, the HTOC noted that
limiting unnecessary discharges, changing testing and training
procedures, and identifying halon alternatives would assist in
protecting the ozone layer.
After implementation of the Montreal Protocol, the fire pro-
tection community and other organizations started to conserve
halon reserves in anticipation of the "impending ban of the pro-
duction and import of halons 1211, 1301, and 2402 that oc-
curred on January 1, 1994." '  Nonetheless, even though
developed countries banned production of halons on January 1,
1994 and developing countries expect to phase-out production
by January 1, 2010, the concentration level of these powerful
ozone destroyers is still rising because of their long atmospheric
lifetime.71
II. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR THE CIVIL AVIATION
INDUSTRY?: A NEED FOR HALON ALTERNATIVES
In the two decades after implementing the Montreal Protocol,
the parties to the agreement and various industries have worked
hard to identify halon substitutes and alternative technologies.72
As a result, the need for halons for new applications as well as
old applications has significantly decreased in most industries.73
However, for some industries such as the military, the merchant
marine community, the oil and gas production industry, and the
civil aviation industry, the reliance on halons in fire suppression
applications has caused problems in transitioning away from
halons. 74 This transition has been especially slow for the civil
aviation industry, which still depends on halons for its fire pro-
tection applications in existing and new aircraft models.75
To assist in the identification of halon alternatives for the vari-
ous industries, the EPA developed the Significant New Alterna-
tives Policy (SNAP) Programme and the U.K. formed the Halon
Alternatives Group (HAG) to create the Toxicological Report on
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 GILLESPIE, supra note 20, at 79. Halons possess a long atmospheric life that
allows them to exist in the atmosphere for an extended period of time, up to
hundreds of years, and cause destruction. Id.
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Alternative Agents to Halon.7 6 These programs research an alter-
native agent's toxicity, global warming potential, commercial
availability, ozone-depleting potential, and other effects on the
environment and evaluate the overall risk to human health and
the environment from use of that alternative agent. "The SNAP
Programme's evaluations and the EPA's determinations of the
acceptability or otherwise of substitutes for Halon 1301 and
Halon 1211 are published through formal notices and rules ...
and are legally binding in the United States.
7 7
As for the civil aviation industry's response to the destructive
nature of halons and the need to identify less harmful alterna-
tives, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) created a
program for identifying, testing, and certifying non-halon fire
extinguishing and suppression systems on aircraft. 78 The pur-
pose of this program was to create performance criteria and cer-
tification methods for developing Minimum Performance
Standards (MPS) to test the halon alternatives. 79 Although the
FAA leads the program and carries out most of the testing, the
program, like the Montreal Protocol, is a global effort and contains
participants from all aspects of the aviation industry. The Joint
Aviation Authorities (JAA) in Europe, the Civil Aviation Author-
ity (CAA) in the United Kingdom, and Transport Canada Avia-
tion (TCA) are all involved with the program. 0 Other program
participants include "aviation regulatory authorities, other gov-
ernment agencies involved in research and development, air-
frame manufacturers, airlines, industry associations,
manufacturers and suppliers of fire protection equipment and
agents, and researchers." '
Additionally, the FAA and the other agencies set up the Inter-
national Halon Replacement Working Group (IHRWG), cur-
rently known as the International Aircraft Systems Fire
Protection Working Group (IASFPWG), in 1993 to provide feed-
back for the program.82 At its first meeting, the IHRWG created
task groups to develop FAA test protocols for the four major
76 Id.
77 Id. at 6, 7.




82 Id.; ROBERT E. TAPSCOTT & LOUISE C. SPEITEL, WILLIAM J. HUGHES TECH.
CTR., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., DOT/FAA/AR-99163, OPTIONS TO THE USE OF
HALONS FOR AIRCRAFT FIRE SUPPRESSION SVsrEMS-2002 UPDATE vii/viii (2002); Fed.
Aviation Admin., Fire Safety Systems: Engine Halon Replacement, http://
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applications of halon fire protection systems on aircraft. 3 The
four major applications include lavatory trash receptacle protec-
tion, handheld extinguishers, engine nacelles and auxiliary
power units (APUs), and cargo compartments.8 4
Based on the work of these task groups, the FAA developed
six general requirements for halon alternatives. First, the alter-
native should provide the same level of protection as the current
halon in use and thus should be suitable for extinguishing the
class of fire likely to occur.85 Second, the alternative and its by-
product used in handheld extinguishers must have an accept-
able toxicity for use around people. 86 Next, the alternative
"should be recognized by a technical, listing, or approval organi-
zation (e.g., NFPA, UL, FMRC) as suitable for the intended pur-
pose. '1 7 The alternative should be compatible with the other
materials used in the fire extinguishing system as well as the
materials in the surrounding areas where the system may be
used. 8 The alternative should also be in compliance with the
Montreal Protocol and should not consist of another ozone-de-
pleting chemical barred under the agreement.8 " Finally, the al-
ternative "must have a near-zero ozone depletion potential
(ODP), and a low global warming potential (GWP) and atmos-
pheric lifetime (ALT) are desirable."9
A. LAVATORY TRASH RECEPTACLE PROTECTION
As a result of two incidents, the FAA proposed that aircraft
should have an automatic fire extinguisher that discharges into
a lavatory trash receptacle.91 The first incident relates to an air-
craft cabin fire on a 1983 Air Canada flight that caused the
www.fire.tc.faa.gov/systems/engine/engine.stm (last visited Nov.
inafter Engine Halon Replacement].
83 HUGHES Assocs. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 5.
84 Id.
85 Id.; TAPSCOTr & SPEITEL, supra note 82, at 42.
86 HUGHES ASSOCS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra
SPEITEL, supra note 82, at 42.
87 HUGHES ASSOCS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra
SPEITEL, supra note 82, at 42.
88 HUGHES ASSOCS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra
SPEITEL, supra note 82, at 42.
89 HUGHES ASSOCS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra
SPEITEL, supra note 82, at 42.
90 HUGHES ASSOCS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra
SPEITEL, supra note 82, at 42.
16, 2007) [here-
note 54, at 5; TAPSCOr &
note 54, at 5; TAPSCOTT &
note 54, at 5; TAPSCOTT &
note 54, at 5; TAPSCOTT &
note 54, at 5; TAPSCOTT &
91 HUGHES Assocs. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 8.
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death of twenty-three individuals.92 The second incident relates
to another 1983 aircraft cabin fire on a plane at Tampa Interna-
tional Airport that caused an evacuation of the plane with no
injuries." In response to the FAA proposal, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation issued Federal Aviation Regulation
(FAR) 14 C.F.R. 121.308b, requiring each lavatory of a passen-
ger-carrying airplane to have "a built-in fire extinguisher for
each disposal receptacle ... that must be designed to discharge
automatically into each disposal receptacle upon occurrence of
a fire in the receptacle."94 Furthermore, the disposal receptacle
must also comply with the design and construction require-
ments under FAR 14 C.F.R. 25.853.
The current lavatory fire extinguisher systems use Halon 1301
as the fire-extinguishing element. 6 As for identifying halon al-
ternatives for these lavatory systems, the FAA finalized the MPS
for the lavatory systems in 1997.17 Besides the general require-
ments for the halon alternatives, the MPS for the lavatory sys-
tems also requires the alternative to be able to extinguish a
paper towel fire and to have a toxicity level of "No Observed
Adverse Effect Level" if the alternative was released into the en-
tire lavatory and not just the trash receptacle.98 The FAA tested
four alternatives, HFC-125, HFC-227ea, HFC-236fa, and En-
virogel, using the 1997 MPS for the lavatory systems. 9
These alternatives represent the various HFCs that the FAA
tested to replace the halon agents in the lavatory trash recepta-
cles with halocarbon systems.' Envirogel also contains a halo-
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Lavatory Fire Protection, 14 C.F.R. § 121.308(b) (2007); HUGHES Assocs. &
ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 8.
95 Compartment Interiors, 14 C.F.R. § 25.853(h) (2007); HUGHES AsSOCS. &
ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 8.
96 HUGHES Assocs. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 8.
97 Id. at 11; see generally TIMOTHY MARKER, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., DOT/FAA/
AR-96/122, DEVELOPMENT OF A MINIMUM PERFORMANCE STANDARD FOR LAVATORY
TRASH RECEPTACLE AUTOMATIC FIRE EXTINGUISHERS (1997).
98 HUGHES ASSOCS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 9.
99 Id. at 12; Catchpole et al., supra note 4, at 7.
100 HUGHES Assocs. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 12; DEP'T OF ENV'T
TRANSP. REGIONS & DEP'T OF TRADE & INDUS. (UK), PHASE OUT OF HALONS: AD-
VICE ON ALTERNATIVES AND GUIDELINES FOR USERS OF FIRE FIGHTING AND EXPLO-
SION PROTECTION SYSTEMS 12 (2001) [hereinafter PHASE OUT OF HALONS],
available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file29105.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2007);
Catchpole et al., supra note 4, at 7.
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carbon component as it is not one specific system.' Instead, it
is the market name that refers to a variety of formulations that
blend halocarbons, dry chemicals, and gels together to create a
fire suppression agent. 10 2 Two of these alternatives, HFC-227ea
and HFC-236fa, have test results that meet the MPS
requirements.1 0
3
Once alternatives are identified, aircraft manufacturers and
suppliers begin their own testing and approval process. In 2004,
Boeing reported that HFC-227ea passed several tests in their
current model aircraft and the company was currently in the
process of getting FAA approval of a Type Certificate for its al-
ternative Lavex bottle assembly and installation process. 10 4 An-
other manufacturer, Airbus, performed tests on a lavatory
system using HFC-236fa, which was approved.'0 5 As of 2006,
Airbus has installed the alternative system in its Airbus A340-600
model.10 6
B. HANDHELD EXTINGUISHERS
Under FAR 14 C.F.R. 25.851, the FAA requires aircraft to have
handheld fire extinguishers in passenger compartments." 7
These FAA regulations require a certain number of extinguish-
ers per plane depending on the number of passengers each air-
craft holds.10 8 The regulations also require that a certain
number of extinguishers contain Halon 1211 or an equivalent
extinguishing agent once the aircraft passenger capacity ex-
ceeds thirty passengers.10 9 The total number of extinguishers
per aircraft range from one extinguisher for 7-30 passenger air-
craft to eight for 601-700 passenger aircraft. 1" 0
10 TAPSCOTr & SPEITEL, supra note 82, at 40; WICKHAM, supra note 57, at 26.
102 TAPSCOTT & SPEITEL, supra note 82, at 40; WIcKHAm, supra note 57, at 26.
103 HUGHES Assocs. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 12-13; Catchpole et
al., supra note 4, at 7.
104 HUGHES Assocs. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 13.
105 Id. at 12.
106 Catchpole et al., supra note 4, at 7.
107 Fire Extinguishers, 14 C.F.R. § 25.851 (2007); HUGHES ASSOCS. & ICF CON-
SULTING, supra note 54, at 14.
108 14 C.F.R. § 25.851; HUGHES ASSOcS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at
14.
109 14 C.F.R. § 25.851; HUGHES ASSOcS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at
14.
110 14 C.F.R. § 25.851; HUGHES ASSOCS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at
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The FAA initially chose Halon 1211 for use in the handheld
extinguishers based on the hijacking/arsonist scenario, where
gasoline is smuggled onto the plane and used to ignite a fire on
a seat cushion."' The hijacking/arsonist scenario is still one of
the tests required under the MPS for handheld extinguishers."12
Besides meeting the general requirements for alternatives, the
alternatives must also meet three other requirements. 1 3 First,
the alternative must show that it can extinguish fires caused by
flammable liquids and flammable gases as well as fires caused by
electrical equipment."14 Second, the alternative must pass the
"hidden fire test" by extinguishing fires in inaccessible areas as
effectively as Halon 1211.115 Finally, the alternative must have
an acceptable toxicity level for use around people.' 16
The FAA finalized the MPS for handheld extinguishers in Au-
gust 2002, and so far, the FAA has identified approximately six
alternatives, including HFC-236fa, HFC-236fa/HFC-23, HCFC
Blend B, HCFC Blend E, and two versions of Envirogel, for test-
ing.' 17 Of the alternatives tested, three of the alternatives, HFC-
227ea, HFC-236fa, and HCFC Blend B, have met the MPS re-
quirements. 1 8 The next step in the process is the aircraft manu-
facturers' internal qualification procedures of testing and
obtaining approval for the alternative systems."' Due to the fact
that these alternatives require more weight, and thus a larger
container, than Halon 1211, the internal qualification process
will include "qualifying a new bracket for the extinguisher, find-
ing a location that supports the larger extinguisher, and con-
ducting structural analyses to ensure that the larger, heavier
extinguisher and bracket can meet mandated load require-
"'I HUGHES ASSOcS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 14.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 14-15; HARRY WEBSTER, WILLIAMJ. HUGHES TECH. CTR., FED. AVIATION
ADMIN., DO/FAA/AR-01/37, DEVELOPMENT OF A MINIMUM PERFORMANCE STAN-
DARD FOR HAND-HELD FIRE EXTINGUISHERS AS A REPLACEMENT FOR HALON 1211 ON
CIVIL TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRCRAFT 1-3 (2002).
114 HUGHES ASSOCS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54 at 14.
115 HUGHES ASSOcS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 14; WEBSTER, supra
note 113, at 1-3.
116 HUGHES Assocs. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 15; WEBSTER, supra
note 113, at 1-3.
"7 HUGHES Assocs. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 19-20; WEBSTER,
supra note 113, at 6-7; Catchpole et al., supra note 4, at 7.
118 HUGHES ASSOCS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 16; Catchpole et al.,
supra note 4, at 7.
119 HUGHES ASSOCS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 20.
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ments."'12" As the handheld extinguisher is still in the internal




C. ENGINE NACELLE AND AUXILIARY POWER UNIT (APU) FIRE
PROTECTION SYSTEMS
Another aircraft application that requires a fire suppression
system is the engine nacelle and APU compartments. Under
FAR 14 C.F.R. 25.1195, the FAA requires fire suppression sys-
tems in engine nacelle and APU compartments to meet three
standards. 22 First, the system must be able to control fires in
the designated fire zones of the engine nacelles and APUs,
which encompass all areas "except for combustor, turbine, and
tail pipe sections of turbine engine installations that contain
lines or components carrying flammable fluids or gases for
which it is shown that a fire originating in these sections can be
controlled."'' 23 Second, the system must be "effective in quantity
of agent, rate of discharge, and distribution by live test during
actual or simulated flight conditions."'124 Finally, the system
must provide sufficient and simultaneous protection through
the entire compartment.' 25
Engine nacelles and APU compartments usually deal with
Class B fires, which are caused by igniting aviation fuel, hydrau-
lic fluid, and other lubricants. 126 Currently, these systems use
Halon 1301 to extinguish these fires. 127 One study expected the
FAA to publish a finalized MPS for engine nacelles and APU
compartments by 2005, but none was available as of 2006.128
However, there are still halon alternatives available for testing
for these systems. 129 The Engine Nacelle Task Group focused
on the program implemented by the U.S. Air Force to identify
120 Id.
121 Catchpole et al., supra note 4, at 7.
122 Fire Extinguisher Systems, 14 C.F.R. § 25.1195 (2007); HUGHES AsSOCS. &
ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 24.
123 14 C.F.R. § 25.1195; HUGHES Assocs. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at
24.
124 14 C.F.R. § 25.1195; HUGHES Assocs. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at
24.
125 14 C.F.R. § 25.1195; HUGHES ASSOCS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at
24.
126 HUGHES ASSOcS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 24.
127 Id. at 25.
128 Id.
129 Catchpole et al., supra note 4, at 7.
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halon alternatives for its engine nacelle and APU compart-
ments. 3 ' The U.S. Air Force identified three alternatives: FIC-
1311, HFC-125, and HFC-227ea."' Of these alternatives, the
U.S. Air Force developed systems using HFC-125 for its engine
nacelles.132 The military sector has already implemented these
alternative systems in a few of its fighterjets and helicopter mod-
els. 13 3 Nonetheless, the civil aviation industry has not been able
to identify any alternatives that meet the FAA's MPS for engine
nacelles because the MPS have not yet been finalized. 3 For
this reason, there are also no alternatives installed on any air-
craft models.1
35
D. CARGO COMPARTMENT FIRE PROTECTION
The fourth civil aircraft application of halons is the cargo
compartment fire protection systems. 1 6 The Federal Air Regu-
lations use cargo accessibility and the type of detection and sup-
pression systems found in each area to classify the cargo
compartments. 137 In addition, the number of compartments re-
quiring fire suppression systems increased based on an FAA rul-
ing that eliminated Class D compartments, which did not
require smoke detection or fire suppression systems. 138 These
compartments must now meet Class C or Class E requirements,
which both require smoke detection and fire suppression sys-
tems.3 9 Other FAA regulations require that cargo compart-
130 HUGHES ASSOcS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 25.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 27.
134 Id. at 25; Catchpole et al., supra note 4, at 7.
135 Catchpole et al., supra note 4, at 7.
136 HUGHES ASSOCS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 5.
137 Id. at 29; Cargo Compartment Classification, 14 C.F.R. § 25.857 (2007).
138 Revised Standards for Cargo or Baggage Compartments in Transport Cate-
gory Airplanes, 63 Fed. Reg. 8032, 8033 (Feb. 17, 1998); HUGHES Assocs. & ICF
CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 29. "A Class D cargo compartment is an inaccessi-
ble compartment that does not have a fire or smoke detection system and a fire
suppression system." Id. at 42 (citing 14 C.F.R. § 25.857).
139 Revised Standards for Cargo or Baggage Compartments, 63 Fed. Reg. at
8033; HUGHES ASSOCS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 29. A Class C com-
partment is a compartment that contains a separate smoke and fire detection
system that alerts the pilot or flight engineer station of a fire, a fire suppression
system that is controlled from the cockpit, devices to keep hazardous quantities
of smoke and fire away from passengers and crew members, and means to con-
trol ventilation in the compartment to assist the fire suppression system. 14
C.F.R. § 25.857. A Class E compartment is a cargo-only compartment that con-
tains a separate smoke and fire detection system that alerts the pilot or flight
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ment systems meet three additional requirements. 4 " First, the
built-in fire extinguishing system must be installed in such a
manner that harmful extinguishing agents are not likely to
enter personnel compartments and that discharge of the system
would not cause structural damage. 4 ' Second, the system must
be capable of handling the size of a fire that is most likely to
occur in the compartment. 142 Finally, the regulations also re-
quire the systems to pass flight tests concerning "compartment
accessibility, entry of hazardous quantities of smoke or extin-
guishing agent into occupied compartments, and the dispersion
of the extinguishing agent in Class C compartments. 143
Four types of fires are likely to occur in cargo compartments:
bulk load fires, containerized fires, surface burning fires, and
aerosol can explosions. 44 Current aircraft models use Halon
1301 as the extinguishing agent in the cargo compartment sys-
tems.'45 The MPS for cargo compartments test all four types of
fires. 146 The FAA finalized the MPS for cargo compartments in
April 2003.' However, the MPS includes a "short" and "long"
version of the aerosol can test and there is controversy over
whether the long-version test provides a sufficient safety stan-
dard for identifying a halon alternative. 48 The difference be-
tween the two versions of tests is that the "short" version relates
to the original procedure that the FAA used to test gaseous ex-
tinguishing agents, and the "long" version relates to the spe-
cially-developed test for non-gaseous systems, such as water spray
systems.' 49 The controversy over the different versions is due to
engineer station of a fire, controls to shut off the airflow to and within the com-
partment, devices to keep hazardous amounts of smoke and flames away from the
flight crew compartment, and accessible crew emergency exits. 14 C.F.R.
§ 25.857.
140 HUGHES Assocs. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 29.
141 14 C.F.R. § 25.851(b); HUGHES Assocs. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54,
at 29.
142 14 C.F.R. § 25.851(b); HUGHES Assocs. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54,
at 29.
143 Cargo or Baggage Compartments, 14 C.F.R. § 25.855(h) (2007); HUGHES
ASSOCS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 29.
144 HUGHES ASSOCS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 30.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 31; see generally JOHN REINHARDT, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., DOT/FAA/
AR-TN0316, MINIMUM PERFORMANCE STANDARD FOR AIRCRAFT CARGO COMPART-
MENT HALON REPLACEMENT FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS (2003). (This document
has now been replaced by DOT/FAA/AR-TN05/20).
148 HUGHES ASSOCS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 31-32.
149 Id. at 32.
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the fact that the "long" version of the aerosol can test may not
provide the same level of safety as Halon 1301.5 °
The FAA has identified four alternatives for testing, including
water mist systems, water mist/nitrogen systems, HFC-125, and
bromotrifluoropropene.' 51 From its testing, the FAA found only
one alternative, the water mist/nitrogen system, that met the
cargo compartment MPS. 152 However, no airframe manufac-
turer appears to be in the process of performing the internal
qualifications procedures for this alternative because the water
mist/nitrogen system only passed the "long" version of the aero-
sol can test and the airframe manufacturers do not believe that
the alternative system provides the same level of safety as the
current halon systems.
153
E. BARRIERS TO THE USE OF HALON ALTERNATIVES IN THE
FOUR APPLICATIONS
The alternative fire suppression systems face different barriers
to implementation depending on the application and its status
in the transition process. 154 In a 2004 report to the EPA, ICF
Consulting (ICF) identified four main barriers in the transition
away from halons in the civil aviation industry.1 55 The four main
barriers are as follows:
(1) the lack of a regulatory mandate to replace halons;
(2) regulatory concerns associated with some of the halon
alternatives;
(3) space, weight, and cost penalties of the halon alternatives;
and
(4) the lack of effective leadership within the aviation commu-
nity in setting non-regulatory halon phase-out target dates or
goals.
156
These barriers represent the main barriers affecting the industry
that ICF identified after evaluating the technical, economic, and
150 Id. at 33.
151 Id.; Catchpole et al., supra note 4, at 7.
152 HUGHES ASSOCS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 33;.Catchpole et al.,
supra note 4, at 7.
153 HUGHEs Assocs. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 33; Catchpole et al.,
supra note 4, at 7.
154 HUGHEs Assocs. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 1.








Only the lavatory trash receptacle application appears to have
no technical barrier to implementing an alternative system. 158
Besides having no technical barriers to implementation, the
HTOC noted that the alternatives identified to replace Halon
1301 in lavatory systems are "technically superior and economi-
cally preferable to Halon 1301 units."'159 Additionally, only doc-
ument changes and no additional design work are necessary to
implement the lavatory system alternatives into the aircraft.1 60
Although the alternatives for the handheld extinguishers pro-
vide the same level of safety as the current Halon 1211 systems,
they are less effective on a weight basis and occupy more space
than the Halon 1211 units. 6 ' For this reason, there may be
some technical barriers to implementing the alternative
handheld systems. I6 2 The alternative handheld systems will also
require new engineering and designs, which the FAA will need
to approve prior to implementing the systems in the aircraft.'63
Nonetheless, design and approval obstacles are minimal for
handheld extinguishers as compared to the technical barriers
facing the implementation of an alternative system for the en-
gine nacelles and APU systems. The MPS for this system is cur-
rently under revision and is not available for review.164 This
revision represents the third revision for this MPS and, at this
point, the MPS only addresses tests for the engine nacelles and
not the APU systems.'65 The IHRWG decided to cease pursuing
criteria for the APUs because the group found that the criteria
157 Id.
158 Id. at 13.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 21.
162 Id. at 20.
163 Id. at 21.
164 See generally FED. AVIATION ADMIN., DRAr MINIMUM PERFORMANCE STANDARD
FOR AIRCRAFT ENGINE AND AUXILIARY POWER UNIT COMPARTMENT FIRE EXTINGUISH-
INc AGENTS/SYSTEMS, http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/systems/MPSE-rev03_sub-
mitted.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2007).
165 Id.; Engine Halon Replacement, supra note 82.
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for the engine nacelles far exceeded the criteria for the APUs. 66
Therefore, the biggest setback for the engine nacelle systems is
that there is no finalized MPS, making it difficult to identify an
alternative agent for this application and to truly understand all
of the barriers to implementing an alternative system. 67
Conversely, having a finalized MPS does not limit the techni-
cal barriers for the cargo compartment application. This is be-
cause the finalized MPS for the cargo compartment contains a
"long" version of the aerosol can test that "is viewed by some,
[including Boeing], as a radical departure from the original ob-
jective of providing equivalent levels of safety to halons."'16 Be-
cause of the "long" version test, the airframe manufacturers may
not accept the final MPS or the alternatives identified under this
testing, and instead continue to search for an alternative ele-
ment that meets the original "short" version of the test.'69 An-
other technical barrier for this application is the alternative
systems' (the water mist/nitrogen systems') dependence on
Onboard Inert Gas Generating Systems (OBIGGS). 70 This de-
pendence is an issue because while military cargo aircraft have
used OBIGSS systems, commercial aircraft have not previously
used this technology.' Moreover, other technical barriers may
exist with this application. However, those technical barriers are
unknown because additional testing is necessary if other alterna-
tives are selected for qualification and certification for civil
aircraft. 172
2. Economic Barriers
Similar to technical barriers, the lavatory trash receptacle is
the only application that does not appear to have any economic
barriers to implementing the alternative system. 173 This is be-
cause the alternatives identified (HFC-227ea, HFC-236fa, and
Envirogel) work better than the current Halon 1301 system,
without adding any weight or design differences. 174 As there are
166 Fed. Aviation Admin., Fire Safety Systems Fire Group: Engine Halon Re-
placement, http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/systems/engine/app-docs.stm (last visited
Nov. 16, 2007).
167 HUGHES Assocs. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 28.
168 Id. at 32-33.
169 Id. at 33.
170 Id. at 34.
171 Id.
172 Id.




no design or weight differences between the alternative systems
and the current Halon 1301 systems, there are no additional
costs for changing the design or substantial weight or space
penalties. 
75
On the other hand, the alternative systems for the handheld
extinguishers pose both weight and space penalties due to the
fact that the alternatives for the handheld systems are less effec-
tive on a weight basis and take up more space than the Halon
1211 systems. 17 6 The gross weights of the alternative elements
for the handheld extinguishers, HFC-227ea, HFC-236fa, and
HCFC Blend B units, are almost twice that of Halon 1211.177
For example, the Halon 1211 extinguishers with the brackets
weigh approximately 5.5 pounds; whereas the alternative extin-
guishers with the brackets weigh approximately ten pounds.1
78
In addition, the dimensions of the Halon 1211 extinguishers are
0.076 cubic feet, but the dimensions for the alternative extin-
guishers range from 0.188 to 0.368 cubic feet.1 79
One can estimate the additional costs of the added weight
from these alternatives. The FAA estimates that, depending on
the aircraft model, the incremental fuel consumption ranges
from 0.003 to 0.010 gallons per flight hour per pound of weight
added. 8' The FAA also estimates that all aircraft fly approxi-
mately 4,400 hours per year. 18 ' Therefore, the additional fuel
required per year per pound based on the incremental fuel con-
sumption data ranges from 13.2 gallons (4,400 hour x 1 pound
x 0.003 gallons/hour/pound) to 44 gallons (4,400 hour x 1
pound x 0.010 gallon/hour/pound). 82 The U.S. Department
of Transportation reports that the average jet fuel price for air-
lines was $1.97 per gallon for 2006.183 Based on 2006 jet fuel
prices, the additional cost of carrying one more pound of weight
ranges from $26 (13.2 gallons x $1.97) to $87 (44 gallons x
$1.97). Therefore, the additional cost of carrying a handheld
extinguisher with an alternative agent rather than an extin-
175 Id.




180 Id. at 21-22.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Bureau of Transp. Statistics, Airline Fuel Cost and Consumption
(1977-1999), http://www.bts.gov/xml/fuel/report/src/index.xml (last visited
Nov. 16, 2007).
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guisher with Halon 1211 ranges from $117 ($26 x 4.5 pounds)
to $392 ($87 x 4.5 pounds).
Although the additional weight of 4.5 pounds (10 pounds per
alternative extinguisher - 5.5 pounds per Halon 1211 extin-
guisher) per extinguisher and a maximum additional cost of
$392 per extinguisher may seem insignificant, any additional
cost will serve as an economic barrier to implementing these
new systems, especially in light of the current status of the indus-
try. Furthermore, the costs may seem insignificant in proportion
to an airline's jet fuel costs for the year, considering that for
fiscal year 2005 AMR Corporation (American Airlines) and
Southwest Airlines reported aircraft fuel expenses of $5.6 billion
and $1.3 billion, respectively. 8 4 However insignificant they may
seem, they are still additional costs. These costs add up, and the
additional cost range of $117 to $392 is only for one extin-
guisher. As mentioned previously, some aircraft models require
up to eight handheld extinguishers per FAA regulations, which
would translate into additional costs ranging from $936 (8 extin-
guishers x 4.5 pounds x $26) to $3,132 (8 extinguishers x 4.5
pounds x $87) per aircraft.
Additional costs are also expected with the alternative units
for the engine nacelle systems, because all of the alternative ele-
ments that the IASFPWG is currently testing weigh more than
the Halon 1301 used in the current systems.18 5 However, the
extent of the additional costs is still unknown because the
IASFPWG has not finalized the MPS for this application, and the
replacement agents are thus not definitive.18 6 Therefore, the ec-
onomic barriers could be significant considering the cost of the
agent and whether any additional design work is necessary.
As for the cargo compartment systems, additional costs are
expected with implementing the alternative systems because the
IASFPWG has already discovered that one of the alternative
agents tested, HFC-125, requires more agent than the current
Halon 1301 systems.1 8 7 Due to the need for more agent, the
IASFPWG expects the alternative system to add significant
weight penalties, and thus significant cost penalties, for each air-
craft."8 8 There may also be additional costs from design work or
184 AMR Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 47 (Feb. 24, 2006); Sw. Airlines
Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 29 (Feb. 1, 2006).
185 HUGHES ASSOCS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 28.
186 Id.




agent costs depending on the alternative selected for qualifica-
tion and certification.
Overall, the economic barrier for three of the aviation appli-
cations-handheld systems, engine nacelle and APU systems,
and cargo compartment systems-is the fact that halon systems
are readily available at lower costs than the new alternative sys-
tems. 189 The prices for the alternative agents are almost ten
times greater than the price of halons. °90 Thus, there is little
economic incentive for the airlines to implement these systems
and incur any additional costs. This disincentive is only in-
creased by the belief that halon supplies will be available for at
least another decade, leaving no need to address this issue
immediately. 191
3. Regulatory Barriers
There appear to be no regulatory barriers for any of the appli-
cations, but that may just be the problem. There are no regula-
tory barriers in the sense that there is no regulation ordering
airlines to transition from the use of halons to other alternative
agents. 19 2 Other sectors, such as the military, the merchant
marine community, and the oil and gas production industry, did
not need a mandate in order to adopt applications that used
halon alternatives. 1 3 However, there is a need for regulation in
order to incentivize civil airlines to implement alternative sys-
tems. "Until supplies of recycled halons either become cost-pro-
hibitive to procure or simply unavailable, or until policy changes
are implemented that push the transition away from halons, the
civil aviation industry lacks an immediate incentive to replace
halons" in any of the applications." 4
Although there may be no regulation to force the civil avia-
tion industry to transition away from halons, there are still two
regulatory issues that the civil aviation industry faces during this
transition. First, the civil aviation industry is a highly-regulated
industry and most of its actions must get approval from the FAA.
Second, in the search for alternative systems and halon replace-
ments, the civil aviation industry must consider the other sub-
stances regulated by the Montreal Protocol.
189 Id. at 21-23.
190 Id. at 3.
19, Id. at 23.
192 Id.
193 Id.; Catchpole et al., supra note 4, at 7.
194 HUGHES Assocs. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 23.
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For example, the Montreal Protocol places limits on the con-
sumption of HCFCs by developed countries that are parties to
the agreement. 9 5 The agreement requires that the United
States and other developed countries meet specific deadlines in
reducing their consumption and production of HCFCs.'96
Moreover, the EPA has decided to accelerate the phase-out of
the most damaging HCFCs (HCFC-141b, HCFC-142b, and
HCFC-22) in order to meet the deadlines set by the Montreal
Protocol.'9 7 The next deadline for the current phase-out sched-
ule required by the EPA is 2010, when consumption of HCFCs
must decrease by sixty-five percent from the original baseline,
and there is to be no production and no importing of HCFC-
142b and HCFC-22, except for use in equipment made before
January 1, 2010.198 Also, the EPA requires complete phase-out
by 2030, when there must be no consumption and no produc-
tion or importation of any HCFCs.'99 Therefore, the Montreal
Protocol may limit the potential alternatives depending on
whether UNEP/HTOC identified the agent as an ozone-deplet-
ing chemical and scheduled it for phase-out. Additionally, some
elements that the civil aviation industry is currently testing may
be identified as harmful to the ozone at a later date, which
could slow down the process significantly.
Of the three types of barriers, the technical and regulatory
barriers appear to be the least restrictive for the civil aviation
industry. The regulatory barriers are the least restrictive be-
cause there are no regulations directing the transition away
from halons, although this may be the problem. As for solving
the technical barriers, the industry needs to prioritize identify-
ing alternative agents for the various applications. However,
resolving the technical barriers may be the most time-consum-
ing considering how long it has taken the industry to identify
the current list of alternative agents. Additionally, the airlines
may not have much time to implement halon alternatives, due
to the available halon supply. Nonetheless, the airlines have
more time than they have money, and so the economic barriers
'95 Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, art. 2F; Envt'l Prot. Agency, HCFC
Phaseout Schedule, http://www.epa.gov/ozone/title6/phaseout/hcfc.html (last
visited Nov. 16, 2007) [hereinafter HCFC Phaseout Schedule].
196 Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, art. 2F; HCFC Phaseout Schedule, supra
note 195.





are the barriers that are the most restrictive and difficult to over-
come. With knowledge of these barriers, the civil aviation indus-
try must decide how to proceed with the transition process.
III. WHERE SHOULD THE CIVIL AVIATION INDUSTRY
GO FROM HERE?: THE NEXT STEP FOR THE CIVIL
AVIATION INDUSTRY AND THE OBSTACLES IT FACES
ICF Consulting (also known as ICF International) is "a global
professional services firm [that has partnered] with government
and commercial clients to deliver consulting services and tech-
nology solutions in energy, environment, transportation, social
programs, defense, and homeland security" since 1969.200
Hughes Associates, Inc. "is a global company with leading fire
protection consultants and engineers, and fire investigators that
specialize in fire testing, fire modeling, and fire protection de-
sign.''2° As a part of its report to the EPA, ICF Consulting and
ICF's subcontractor, Hughes Associates, Inc., (collectively ICF)
identified the steps and the estimated time to complete the tran-
sition away from the current halon systems to alternative extin-
guishing units in commercial aircraft applications. 2° 2 The
transition process involves six steps.20 3 The first step is the final-
ization of Minimum Performance Standards (MPS) for the four
fire suppression applications. 20 4 The next step, which ICF esti-
mates to take six to twelve months to complete, entails the FAA
testing alternative agents under the MPS for each of the four
applications. 20 5 Third, the airframe manufacturers must per-
form qualification testing of the alternative agents and sys-
tems. 20 6 ICF expects this testing to take twelve to eighteen
200 ICF Int'l, Company Overview, http://www.icfi.com/AboutUs/ (last visited
Nov. 16, 2007).
201 Hughes Assocs., Inc., Fire Science & Engineering, http://www.haifire.com
(last visited Nov. 16, 2007).
202 HUGHES ASSOCS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 37. Under a contract
with the EPA, ICF Consulting and its subcontractor, Hughes & Associates, pre-
pared a report summarizing the transition process away from halons for the civil
aviation industry. Id. at 1. Peer reviewers, which included Jeff Gibson of Ameri-
can Pacific, Dave Catchpole of BP Exploration, Steve McCormick of the U.S.
Army, and representatives of Kidde Aerospace and The Boeing Company, re-
viewed ICF's draft final report. Id. ICF made edits and corrections to the report
based on the peer reviewers' comments. Id.
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months to complete.2 °7 The fourth step, which ICF estimates
will require three to six months to complete, involves preparing
and submitting a modified type certification for the new system
to the FAA.208 Next, the FAA must approve the modified type
certification submitted by the aircraft manufacturers.20 9 ICF ex-
pects the FAA approval process to take three to six months to
complete for each certification request.210 Finally, the last step,
which ICF estimates to require another three to six months to
complete, consists of designing and implementing the approved
alternative system into the aircraft model.211
Currently, the civil aviation industry has not even completed
the first step for all of the applications because the finalized
MPS for engine nacelles is still outstanding.21 2 The FAA has
been in the process of finalizing the MPS for engine nacelles for
at least two years. 213 Moreover, the industry has only reached
the final step of implementing an alternative system for one ap-
plication, the lavatory system, and in only one aircraft model,
the Airbus A340-600. 2 4 This emphasizes that the already time-
consuming process is taking even more time than expected with
many delays.
Despite the many levels of approval required to implement a
new design and safety system, "the lack of a regulatory require-
ment to eliminate halon use [is most] cited as a reason for the
slow transition away from halons in civil aviation. 21 5 Further-
more, the regulations that do exist actually allow the civil avia-
tion industry to postpone the transition process.21 6 These
regulations allow the civil aviation industry to use recycled
halons to avoid the costs of retiring current halon systems early,
and thus give no incentive to the industry to search for alterna-
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stockpiles and retired equipment to supply their old and new
aircraft.218
On the other hand, the lack of regulations did not prevent
other industries, such as the military, the merchant marine com-
munity, and the oil and gas production industry, from making
the transition away from halons.219 These sectors also faced an
unregulated environment in terms of the halon transition and
significant cost penalties for redesigning fire suppression sys-
tems and using alternative agents, but they were nevertheless
able to make the transition successfully. 220 An important key to
the success of these sectors' transitions was their ability to "main-
tain existing systems (thus retaining the initial equipment
investment) while adopting halon alternatives in all new
installations. 221
However, the bigger key for these industries was the fact that
they were able to identify an alternative more easily. The fire
protection industry as a whole experienced a setback in identify-
ing halon alternatives.222 From the signing of the Montreal Pro-
tocol in 1987 to the halon production ban in 1994, the fire
protection industry was generally optimistic that it would be able
to find alternative agents to halons that would be more effective
than the halons themselves. 223 Nonetheless, after years of re-
search, the industry realized that it would have to make com-
promises in the replacement agents and that it had spent a lot of
time and money in creating alternatives that were not commer-
cially viable. 224 The compromises stemmed from the fact that
the alternative agents identified were less effective and more ex-
pensive than halons.225
Other industries have found the process of identifying alter-
natives easier than the civil aviation industry for several reasons.
For the oil and gas production sector, the main difference is
that the sector does not face the same space issues as the civil
aviation industry.226 The oil and gas production sector replaced
halon systems primarily with water mist systems in new designs
218 Id.
219 Id. at 7-8.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 8.
222 WICKHAM, supra note 57, at 11-12.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 12.
226 Id. at 20.
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and processes.227 The main drawback with water mist systems is
that the design and engineering process must ensure that there
is a sufficient concentration of water released in the space to
extinguish the fire. 228 For the civil aviation industry, the weight
of the water and the space needed to carry a sufficient amount
of water creates greater cost and space penalties than it does for
the oil and gas production sector, which is "relatively insensitive
to weight and space requirements. "229 Water for these systems is
inexpensive, but the added weight from the amount of water
necessary for these systems and the space needed for these sys-
tems would increase an aircraft's fuel costs. 230
On the other hand, the transition was easier for the merchant
marine community because the industry was able to fall back on
the systems it used prior to the implementation of halons.23' Af-
ter the development of Halon 1301, the merchant marine com-
munity quickly moved from carbon dioxide systems to Halon
1301 systems for fire protection because halon was less expen-
sive.23 2 Once halon production ceased and ship manufacturers
could no longer install Halon 1301 on new vessels, the sector
reverted back to the carbon dioxide systems because there was
no regulation banning the carbon dioxide systems, the sector
knew the systems worked, and it was a less expensive option
compared to researching another halon alternative.233
It is not that simple for the civil aviation industry. The avia-
tion industry cannot fall back on old systems because most of its
current applications were originally implemented with halon.
For example, halons were readily available when the FAA imple-
mented regulations requiring airframe manufacturers to install
handheld extinguishers and lavatory trash receptacle extinguish-
ers on all aircraft. 2 4 Therefore, the first agents placed in these
systems were Halon 1211 and Halon 1301, respectively. 2 5 In ad-
dition, carbon dioxide systems are not the best option for the
aviation industry due to the risks and cost penalties associated
with these systems. The risks associated with carbon dioxide pri-
227 Id. at 19.
228 PHASE OUT OF HALoks, supra note 100, at 13.
229 WICKHAM, supra note 57, at 20.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 19.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 See 14 C.F.R. § 25.851 (2007); 14 C.F.R. § 121.308b (2007).
235 WICKHAM, supra note 57, at 8-9.
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marily relate to health effects and safety issues, making carbon
dioxide a poor choice for the airlines, as they are responsible for
the lives of their passengers and employees. 2 6 Also, carbon di-
oxide itself is inexpensive, but the containers for the carbon di-
oxide are relatively heavy and would impose large cost penalties
for the airlines.237
It was also difficult for the military sector, which faces similar
weight, space, and cost penalties to those faced in the civil avia-
tion industry. However, unlike the civil aviation industry and
the FAA, the Department of Defense implemented a multi-mil-
lion-dollar research program to identify halon alternatives.238 In
addition, not all of the fire suppression applications are the
same for the military sector and the civil aviation industry.
Some of the applications, specifically the applications for the
U.S. Army and Navy, are more similar to the applications for the
oil and gas production industry and merchant marine commu-
nity. 2 9 Nonetheless, the engine nacelle application is similar to
the civil aviation industry, and the military believes that it has
identified an alternative in HFC-125. 240 The military sector im-
plemented fire suppression systems with the HFC-125 alternative
despite the space, weight, and associated cost penalties. 24 1 How-
ever, the necessary quantity of the alternative agent was much
less than the amount estimated by the Department of De-
fense.2 42 Therefore, the military sector was expecting to imple-
ment an alternative with greater penalties, and it was therefore
easier to implement the alternative identified. The civil aviation
industry may be able to use this alternative in its systems, but it
must first finalize the MPS for this application. 243
Although the model used by the other industries to maintain
old halon systems while implementing alternatives in the new
systems may be helpful to the civil aviation industry, it may also
be very difficult for the industry to follow. The average lifetime
of a commercial aircraft ranges from twenty-five to thirty
236 WICKHAM, supra note 57, at 34. See U.S. ENvT'L PROT. AGENCy, EPA430-R-00-
002, CARBON DIOXIDE AS A FIRE SUPPRESSANT: EXAMINING THE RISKS 5-7 (2000),
available at http://www.epa.gov/ozone/snap/fire/co2/co2report.pdf.
237 PHASE OUT OF HALONS, supra note 100, at 18.
238 WICKHAM, supra note 57, at 11.
239 See id. at 31-32.
240 Id. at 32.
241 HUGHES Assocs. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 27.
242 Id.
243 Catchpole et al., supra note 4, at 7.
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years.244 Due to the long useful lives of aircraft, it is likely to be
expensive for the airlines to implement halon alternatives into
the new aircraft and maintain the old halon systems while
searching for alternative agents. However, without regulations
pushing the airlines to transition away from halons, this high
cost will be the economic incentive the industry needs to en-
courage the transition.245
If the pressure that the civil aviation industry needs to hasten
the transition away from halons does not come from regulations
or the high cost, it is likely to come from the depleting halon
supplies available for the industry's fire suppression systems. In
its October 2006 meeting, the IASFWPG expressed concern that
there are not adequate amounts of halon available to meet the
civil aviation needs twenty to thirty years from now. 24 6 The
group also questioned whether there is enough Halon 1211 to
support the life of the aircraft currently being produced because
it is becoming increasingly difficult to find halon in the United
States and Europe. 24 7 The current estimates show that Europe
has a five-year supply of halon remaining. 248 Additionally, the
price of the halon available is also rising, making the current
fire suppression systems costly to maintain. 249 Due to the status
of the halon supply, there is a focus and concern in the aviation
industry for airlines to bank and properly recycle halon.25 °
Therefore, the status of the halon supply also serves as an indi-
rect economic incentive for the airlines to implement halon
alternatives.
Overall, the economic incentives, rather than a regulatory
mandate, are more likely to encourage the civil aviation industry
to pursue halon alternatives more rigorously. The main reason
for this is the current economic condition of the U.S. airline
244 Id.
245 Id. at 8.
246 Tom Cortina, Halon Alternatives Research Corp., International Environ-
mental Update, Presentation at the International Aircraft Systems Fire Protection
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industry.2 5 ' Although the industry showed improvement in 2006
and the Air Transportation Association expects the industry to
record earnings ranging from $2 to $3 billion dollars for the
year, the industry is still struggling and trying to recover from
the $35 billion in net losses that the industry reported over the
past five years.252 The major airlines focused on "painstaking,
ongoing cost reduction efforts and balance-sheet repair" for the
past few years in order to improve their financial condition.2 53
However, the improved financial condition does not mean the
struggle is over. The airlines still face high debt levels and re-
main susceptible to recession, fuel price increases, and ex-
traordinary circumstances, such as natural disasters.254 Thus,
the industry's focus remains on controlling costs, and any addi-
tional costs, such as the ones associated with the fire suppression
applications, are very unwelcome.25 5
The emphasis on cutting expenses has overshadowed the
need to implement halon alternatives and the airlines have not
been in a hurry to implement any alternatives for this reason.
Most of the halon alternatives that satisfy the MPS tests for each
application, as well as the alternatives just identified for testing,
all have associated weight and space penalties. These weight
and space penalties translate into cost penalties because of the
additional fuel and design work that is required to implement
and maintain these systems. With the weight and cost penalties,
the airlines are less than eager to implement these systems be-
cause of their negative impact on the bottom line. Nonetheless,
while the civil aviation industry has been ignoring the transition
process, the halon supply has been decreasing, and it has
reached a point where either the civil aviation industry or the
regulatory authorities needs to act.
Although there is a need for a plan of action from a regula-
tory body, a regulation or plan of action must be implemented
with great care considering that other industries were successful
in transitioning away from halon use without such regulation.256
The plan of action could be as simple as performing additional
251 See John Heimlich, Air Transp. Ass'n, 2007 Outlook: "Reaching for the
Skies?", http://www.airlines.org/economics/review-andoutlook/ATA2007Econ
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research for the civil aviation industry to encourage the industry
to take action more quickly. In its 2004 report to the EPA, ICF
Consulting recommended several items for the aviation industry
to research further to determine the best plan of action.257
These items include researching the costs and benefits of vari-
ous phase-out scenarios, the costs of the incentives and disincen-
tives in the halon transition, the costs of local and global halon
supplies over the next ten to twenty years, the current and pro-
jected overall U.S. market demand and civil aviation industry de-
mand for halon, and the impact and potential cost savings from
early implementation of halon alternatives. 25 Depending on
the analysis performed, the findings will more than likely show
the industry members that the halon transition problem is not
something to be ignored, and ignoring the problem is just as
costly as addressing the problem.
The parties to the Montreal Protocol recognize the need for a
global effort in addressing the issues involved with the transition
away from halons. The parties have encouraged the technical
advisors to the Montreal Protocol to work with the ICAO to cre-
ate a plan of action for the civil aviation industry.259 The parties
have agreed to an action plan, known as the Decision XV/11
action plan, which consists of four phases.26° In the first phase,
the Halon Technical Options Committee (HTOC) under the
UNEP must compile information on the global halon supply,
halon costs, and current emissions rates, and present this infor-
mation to the ICAO. 261 The ICAO will then be responsible for
distributing the information to its members.262 Using this data,
the "ICAO will issue a State Letter to member States in 2006,
inviting them to require the use of proven alternatives in new
aircraft designs to the extent practicable. '' 263 The next phase en-
tails making the halon transition a priority at the ICAO Assem-
bly in 2007. At the assembly, the "ICAO Secretariat will
introduce an ICAO/HTOC working paper on the subject of
257 Id. at 41.
258 Id.
259 Catchpole et al., supra note 4, at 29.
2-0 Id.; Tom Cortina, Halon Alternatives Research Corp., International Envi-
ronmental Update, Presentation at the International Aircraft Systems Fire Protec-
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phasing out halons."264 If the ICAO assembly approves the rec-
ommendations and action plan in the working paper, then the
member States will be "required to implement halon alterna-
tives for identified applications in new airframe designs first cer-
tified on or after January 1, 2009. ' '265
Therefore, the civil aviation industry may soon be required to
transition away from halons in 2009. However, the civil aviation
industry will need help to meet these deadlines. To assist in the
process, the FAA should expedite the certification process for
the alternative agents and the related applications. 266 The FAA
should especially focus on expediting the certification process
for those agents shown by the test groups to provide a safety
level that is equivalent to the halons currently in use.2 67
A joint effort by all of the ICAO member States will be the
most successful in responding to the barriers in the transition
away from halons to other alternatives. 268 This joint effort will
also be a necessity if the industry is to meet the 2009 deadline.
To meet this deadline, the industry members will have to make
the transition process a priority. Additional testing needs to be
performed on the various alternative agents. Moreover, air-
frame manufacturers should begin the qualification and certifi-
cation procedures for the alternatives that have already met the
MPS standards for any of the four applications. Essentially, any
regulations passed to implement this deadline will help make
the transition a priority and will force the airlines to invest in the
alternative applications regardless of the impact on their bottom
line.
IV. SUMMARY OF THE TRANSITION AWAY FROM
HALONS FOR THE CIVIL AVIATION INDUSTRY
In response to the discovery of the hole in the ozone layer,
the members of the United Nations Environment Programme
implemented the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer with the goal of eliminating the harmful effects
of the ozone-depleting substances, such as halons, on the ozone.
The Montreal Protocol began a global effort to phase out the
production and consumption of ozone-depleting substances.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 30.
266 HUGHES ASSOCS. & ICF CONSULTING, supra note 54, at 35-36.
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The Montreal Protocol required developed countries to ban
halon production by January 1, 1994, and developing countries
by January 1, 2010. In support of the Montreal Protocol, other
agencies, including the EPA, implemented rules and regulations
to enforce the restrictions implemented by the international
agreement. To comply with these restrictions, halon users iden-
tified alternative agents to replace the halons in their fire extin-
guisher systems, used primarily for their superior fire
suppression capabilities.
For the most part, halon users were able to make the transi-
tion away from halons; however, four industries, the military sec-
tor, the oil and gas production industry, the merchant marine
community, and the civil aviation industry experienced greater
difficulties in the transition process. 269 At this point, the civil
aviation industry remains furthest behind in the transition pro-
cess, as it continues to rely heavily on halons in its existing and
new aircraft models. 27" Although the other three industries
lagged behind the majority, they were able to make the transi-
tion more easily than the civil aviation industry for three main
reasons. First, the merchant marine community was able to re-
vert back to the carbon dioxide systems they previously used that
were not banned by federal regulations. 271 Second, the military
sector and the oil and gas production industry did not have as
great of weight, space, and cost penalties associated with the al-
ternative agents as compared to the civil aviation industry.272
Third, the military sector invested a large amount of money in
identifying alternatives, which enabled them to find an alterna-
tive with fewer cost penalties than expected.273
The civil aviation industry faces technical, economic, and reg-
ulatory barriers in implementing alternative agents into its four
fire suppression applications, which include the lavatory trash
receptacle, handheld, cargo compartment, and engine nacelle
extinguisher systems. 274 The technical barriers include develop-
ing minimum performance standards and testing procedures
for each of the applications as well as designing systems for the
new alternative agents if necessary.27 - While the technical barri-
269 See WIC-IAM, supra note 57, at 11-12.
270 See id.
271 See supra text accompanying notes 231-36.
272 See supra text accompanying notes 226-30, 238-43.
273 See WICKHAM, supra note 57, at 11.
274 See supra text accompanying notes 154-60.
275 See supra text accompanying notes 158-71.
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ers should be the easiest for the civil aviation industry to over-
come, it has taken the industry longer than expected to develop
the standards and procedures for each application, and only
one application for one model aircraft currently has an alterna-
tive system in place. Furthermore, the aviation industry does
not appear to be remotely close to installing an alternative sys-
tem in any of the other applications. This is due to the signifi-
cant weight, cost, and space penalties associated with the
alternative agents and the cost-focus attitude of the aviation in-
dustry. The focus of the industry as a whole is to reduce costs;
thus, implementing these alternative systems is not a priority
and no regulation is currently forcing civil airlines to implement
alternatives, or penalizing the industry for not implementing
any alternatives.
Overall, there are three factors that impede the civil aviation
industry's transition away from halon alternatives. The industry
believes that the halon supply is sufficient to last at least ten
years, no current regulations are forcing the issue on the finan-
cially unstable industry, and all of the alternative systems, except
for the lavatory trash receptacle extinguisher, possess weight,
cost, and space penalties. 276 However, the civil aviation industry
may soon have to change its priorities to respond to the ICAO's
2009 deadline. The FAA should focus on testing additional al-
ternatives for each application to identify more acceptable
agents for the industry, while the airframe manufacturers
should begin procedures to certify systems using agents that al-
ready meet the MPS and testing procedures for each applica-
tion. To make the civil aviation industry's transition away from
halons successful, the industry as a whole, including the re-
searchers, the FAA, the airframe manufacturers, the suppliers,
and the airlines, must work together to make it a priority.
276 WICKHAM, supra note 57, at 30.
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